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TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN HISTORIANS
ENTER THE COURTROOM
DAVID ROSNER*
I
INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, as I was sitting at my desk in my overcrowded office, I
received an odd e-mail. “Dear Professor,” it began,
I am writing to introduce you to Round Table Group [RTG], and to notify you of a
specific, short-term consulting opportunity which may be of interest. Our attorney
client is seeking an historian, highly credentialed, and at a prestigious university, to
perform some historical research and instruct a lay jury about what was known about
1
a particular occupational hazard (lead paint contamination) between 1950 and 1980.

The letter went on to explain how the historian sought “need not be a
subject matter expert” but only need be a “good communicator” who could
“easily communicate a story to a lay jury.”2 The e-mail continued in some detail,
telling me how the process would work: If I were interested, I could send in my
resume, a brief explanation of my expertise, and a statement of my consulting
fee. After consulting with their industry client, I would be set up on a
conference call to “determine if there is mutual interest in going forward.”3 The
note continued by informing me about the consulting group: it was a consortium
of “several thousand professors” in “management, law, medicine, science,
computer science, education, engineering, economics, and other disciplines who
make themselves available . . . to law firms and companies who are clients of
Round Table Group.”4 Historians, it appeared, were a new addition to their
stable of experts.

Copyright © 2009 by David Rosner.
This Article is also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Ronald H. Lauterstein Professor of Sociomedical Science and History, Columbia University,
and Co-Director, Center for the History & Ethics of Public Health. I would like to thank Marian Moser
Jones who aided me in gathering some of the historiographic materials. Also, I would like to thank
Gerald Markowitz for his comments on this draft.
1. E-mail from Barb Noverini to David Rosner (Jan. 13, 2005, 16:00:05 EST) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Round Table Group, http://www.roundtablegroup.com/litigation/experts.cfm (last
visited Aug. 21, 2008) (noting that the organization’s academic consultants now number over 65,000,
including university deans and prominent professors).
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What was ironic, if that’s the right word, was that RTG was searching for an
expert to testify on behalf of companies in a lead-paint trial, and at that very
moment I was preparing to testify in a major lead-paint trial on behalf of the
State of Rhode Island.5 I, with Gerald Markowitz, had written a book on the
lead and vinyl industries6 based on documents we had uncovered. The
documents, an affidavit we had written, and the book had all become part of a
landmark case in which Rhode Island’s Attorney General, along with the
support of the plaintiffs’ law firm, Motley Rice, were suing the lead-pigment
manufacturers to get them to remove lead paint from hundreds of thousands of
buildings in the state. It appeared that the lead industry was searching for
someone to testify against me.
Clearly, this recruitment letter was part of a larger phenomenon. In recent
years historians have been brought into legal cases in unprecedented numbers.7
As the courts have tried to adjudicate responsibility for environmental and
occupational diseases, history has played an increasingly central role in
decisions that affect the cases themselves and in social policy regarding risk. In
suits over tobacco-related diseases, asbestosis, radiation, and other toxic
substances, more historians of technology and science, social history, and public
health are being sought to provide testimony aimed at assessing responsibility
for damages that have arisen years—sometimes decades—after exposure. The
basic questions asked were predictable: Who knew what about specific toxins
and when did they know it? Did industries understand that specific substances
could cause disease? If so, when did they learn of the dangers and when did
they begin to warn their workers or their consumers of their products that they
were at risk?
As the role of the historian has expanded, so too has the controversy
surrounding historians’ participation. At the annual meeting of the American
Association for the History of Medicine, traditionally a collegial conclave of
subspecialists, a panel on the history of childhood diseases ended up in a
shouting match after a respected historian who had been a consultant for the
tobacco, asbestos, soft-drink, and lead industries, presented a paper arguing
that the lead industry had done nothing wrong before the 1950s, and that, in any
case, the problem of childhood lead poisoning was vastly overblown.8 During
the conference the halls were abuzz with gossip and amazement, and it soon
became apparent that many more members had been consulting for industry.
The then-current president of the Association and Professor of Medicine and
History at Washington University had been testifying and writing affidavits for
5. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I.
2008).
6. GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002).
7. See generally Robert N. Proctor, Should Medical Historians Be Working for the Tobacco
Industry?, 363 LANCET 1174, 1174 (2004) (describing how “at least 29” historians of medicine have
served as expert witnesses for the tobacco industry).
8. Patricia Cohen, History for Hire in Industry Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at B7.
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the tobacco industry for nearly fifteen years.9 Another Professor of Medicine
and History at Duke University had worked for the tobacco industry as well as
the lead industry throughout the 1990s;10 less well-known historians had been
recruited by Big Tobacco and other industries.11 Some fifty-seven colleagues
have worked for the tobacco industry alone.12
Significantly, the origins of historians entering into liability cases originated
with the defense bar. Efforts of the tobacco industry to recruit historians to
testify for the industry began as early as 1987 when historian John Burnham, a
director for “Project Cosmic,” known as Philip Morris’s “secret effort,” tried to
convene “‘an international network of scientists and historians’ to write
histories casting the industry in a favorable light.”13 Since at least the 1980s, the
tobacco industry has been hiring historians to refute claims that it should have
at least warned consumers of the dangers of their products.14 Similarly, the lead
industry hired historians to develop its case that it had little knowledge of the
impact of lead-paint poisoning on children until the 1950s, and that it had acted
responsibly as soon as it found out.15
The industry’s response to historians entering the courtroom has thus been
fairly profound, whichever side of the controversy the historians were
representing. Although industry law firms have been actively recruiting
historians for some time, a smaller group of historians are being called upon to
provide testimony concerning the responsibility of industry in undermining the
health of U.S. citizens. Allan Brandt at Harvard worked for the federal
government on a suit against tobacco companies.16 Robert Proctor of Stanford
has worked on the same suit and has, in the past, testified in suits on behalf of
women injured by radiation experiments at Vanderbilt University.17 David
Rothman has likewise worked on the Vanderbilt case.18 Industrial hygienists
David Ozonoff and Barry Castleman have weighed in, offering historical
documentation on behalf of workers injured by exposure to asbestos and

9. See Robert N. Proctor, Everyone Knew But No One Had Proof: Tobacco Industry Use of
Medical History Expertise in US Courts, 1990–2002, 363 TOBACCO CONTROL, at iv117, iv118 (2006)
(noting that one professor’s “work for the industry dates back to August of 1988”).
10. Id. at iv123.
11. See generally id. at iv122.
12. Id.
13. Id. at iv118. This “secret effort” was waged from 1987–1993. Id.
14. See generally ALLAN BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007).
15. See, e.g., Aff. of Peter C. English, M.D., Ph.D., City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 700
N.Y.S.2d 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 1999) (No. 14365/89) (where English argues that until the early
1950s, childhood lead poisoning was considered to be relatively rare in the United States in comparison
with other poisoning and with major causes of childhood morbidity and mortality); see also, PETER C.
ENGLISH, OLD PAINT: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD LEAD-PAINT POISONING IN THE
UNITED STATES TO 1980 (2001).
16. See BRANDT, supra note 14.
17. Robert N. Proctor, Expert Witnesses Take the Stand, 407 NATURE 15, 15-16 (2000).
18. See David J. Rothman, Serving Clio and the Client: The Historian as Expert Witness, 77 BULL.
HIST. MED. 25, 25 (2003).
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developing historical arguments about the culpability of Johns-Manville and
other asbestos manufacturers.19 Gerald Markowitz and I have detailed the ways
that silicosis, lead, and vinyl production have undermined workers’ and
consumers’ health and have testified and been deposed in silicosis, lead, and
vinyl-chloride cases. Each of us has gone through his or her own internal, moral
decisionmaking process in deciding whether to work for industries or for those
injured by industries, institutions, or products.
This article looks at the recent recruitment of historians into the world of
toxic-tort law and examines the ways that the craft of history is used and abused
in the legal system. It will identify the important ways that historians’ skills can
be used on behalf of people claiming to be harmed by a variety of industries as
well as the ways that these same skills have been used to defend industry
activities. I do not intend to provide a dispassionate analysis of the moral,
ethical, and legal dilemmas that confront the historian when she or he enters
the courtroom. Nor do I mean to enter into a discussion of the problem of
historical ambiguity and objectivity. Rather, I will integrate a scholarly as well
as a personal perspective on the concerns that will undoubtedly deepen among
historians.
II
WHY HISTORIANS? WHY NOW?
The origins of historians’ role in these cases are rooted in the fundamental
transformation of peoples’ health concerns and beliefs during the course of the
past half century. For much of the first fifty years of the twentieth century,
health concerns were dominated by the popular understanding of the causes of
illness as being rooted in the then-emerging ideas about germs: disease was
commonly understood to be linked directly to specific bacteria or viruses, or,
alternatively, for the industrial worker, to specific acute exposures to a toxin.20
Generally, the symptoms that affected the individual were understood to be
caused by acute and specific agents—whether bacteriological or chemical—
which could be identified in the laboratory using increasingly sophisticated
technologies.21 Tuberculosis, for example, could be understood to be “caused”
by a bacterium, while the palsies, tremors, or wrist-drop of an industrial worker

19. See generally David Ozonoff, Failed Warnings: Asbestos-Related Disease and Industrial
Medicine, in THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF WORKERS: CASE STUDIES IN THE POLITICS OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 139 (Ronald Bayer ed., 1988); BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS:
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS (5th ed. 2005).
20. See, e.g., David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Safety and Health as a Class Issue: The Workers’
Health Bureau of America During the 1920s, in DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS’ SAFETY AND HEALTH
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53, 58 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1987) (describing
the health hazards that the “growing auto industry” produced both for workers within and people living
“far beyond the auto plants themselves”).
21. See JOHN HARLEY WARNER, THE THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE: MEDICAL PRACTICE,
KNOWLEDGE, AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA, 1820–1885 156–57 (1986) (noting increased usage of
urinalyses and other chemical tests by hospitals throughout nineteenth century).
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could be identified as “caused” by exposure to lead in a battery plant or other
industrial setting.22
But, during the course of the twentieth century, basic public-health
measures like improved sanitation, a purified water supply, street cleaning, and
nutrition, among others, began to have a dramatic impact on the health of U.S.
citizens.23 Lower rates of infant mortality and longer life spans paralleled
improvements in environmental and engineering controls over water-borne
diseases such as typhoid or cholera, diseases transmitted by insect vectors such
as yellow fever or malaria, and other infectious diseases such as diphtheria,
transmitted through the air we breathed or through person-to-person contact.24
Further, with the development of the first sulfa drugs, antibiotics, and effective
vaccines against polio, measles, mumps, and other childhood diseases in the
middle decades of the century, many in the U.S. believed that the dangers from
infectious disease were passing.25 Chronic conditions such as heart disease,
cancer, and stroke replaced tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in the
popular and professional imaginations as the major threats to U.S. health.26 By
the 1970s, many in the public-health community were seeking a different model
for understanding what caused a variety of chronic diseases.27 The very notion of
causation was undergoing a profound transformation.
The advent of a vibrant environmental movement fed a new paradigm for
understanding disease.28 Chronic conditions were seen increasingly as rooted in
the personal behavior of individuals or in the industrial–consumer world in
which we now lived.29 The emergence of the United States as the predominant
world economic and military power in the years after World War II fed a
growing uneasiness about what appeared to be inequality and economic
disparities.30 For some in the public-health community, disease was increasingly
perceived as a signal of the inequalities and injustices brought about by the

22. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE ON-GOING
STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS’ HEALTH 18 (2005).
23. See John H. Knowles, The Responsibility of the Individual, in DOING BETTER AND FEELING
WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 61 (John H. Knowles ed., 1977) (noting the importance
of these public-health measures for improving the health of U.S. citizens).
24. Gretchen A. Condran, Changing Patterns of Epidemic Disease in New York City, in HIVES OF
SICKNESS: PUBLIC HEALTH AND EPIDEMICS IN NEW YORK CITY 27, 36 (David Rosner ed., 1995).
25. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 106
(1974).
26. Knowles, supra note 23, at 61.
27. See id. (describing how accidents, lifestyle choices, and other factors may lead to chronic
diseases).
28. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 187–98 (1962) (exploring the effects of pesticides and
other toxins on humans).
29. See FUCHS, supra note 25, at 31 (noting “the importance of ‘life-style’ and personal behavior as
major determinants of ‘who shall live’”). See generally Knowles, supra note 23.
30. See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1970).
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rampant commercialization of medicine, the poor distribution of services, and
the inadequacies in the distribution of care.31
If the 1950s and 1960s were a period of unbridled exuberance regarding the
ability of industrial production to improve our lives, the late 1970s and 1980s
brought to national attention some of the negative impacts of industrial society
on U.S. health.32 The neighborhood of Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York,
was found to be polluted by the waste products of the Hooker Chemical
Company. A whole community of lower-middle-class homeowners had to
abandon homes as the contents of leaking barrels and waste pits upon which
these houses were built slowly bubbled up into basements and backyards.33 At
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, a nuclear plant nearly went into meltdown34
just at the time when the film “The China Syndrome” made citizens all too
aware of the pitfalls of nuclear energy.35 In Times Beach, Missouri, an entire
community was evacuated and huge areas of the town roped off after it was
discovered that dioxins, known human carcinogens, had polluted the streets of
the town.36 In Bhopal, India, thousands of poor people were killed, blinded, and
otherwise maimed by an explosion of a Union Carbide plant.37 Unlike the
infectious diseases of previous eras—or even their more recent appearance in
the form of AIDS, SARS, and anthrax—the chronic diseases and injuries that
have come to concern us most were linked in the public mind to environmental
and occupational exposures.38
The growing awareness of the dangers of industrial pollution and industrial
products more generally have fed a widespread sense that the killer diseases of
greatest concern were produced by a variety of industrial pollutants and
consumer goods now a mainstay of U.S. life. These goods—cigarettes, plastic
bottles, fatty foods, and sugar-laden soft drinks, to name but a few—were no
longer seen solely as symbols of the good life but also as culprits in the
epidemics of lung cancer, heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and other chronic

31. SPENCER KLAW, THE GREAT AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW: THE UNHEALTHY STATE OF U.S.
MEDICAL CARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 60 (1975).
32. SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 21 (1978).
33. See generally ROBERT P. WHALEN, GOVERNOR’S LOVE CANAL INTER-AGENCY TASK
FORCE, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB (1978).
34. See generally MITCHELL ROGOVIN, NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP,
THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER AND TO THE PUBLIC (1980).
35. THE CHINA SYNDROME (IPC Films 1979) (This popular movie, starring Jane Fonda, Michael
Douglas, and Jack Lemmon, detailed the meltdown of a nuclear reactor’s core and the attempted
cover-up by the plant’s owners and managers. In the midst of the crisis, one of the characters utters that
“an area the size of Pennsylvania” might become permanently uninhabitable, bringing home the fact
that the Three Mile Island reactors were located in Pennsylvania.).
36. Tom Uhlenbrock, Crews Begin Cleanup of Dioxin Site; Old Truck Terminal is “Hottest” in
Region, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 1995, at 1A.
37. Gas Deaths in India Exceed 1,000, with Thousands Hurt; Gandhi Seeks Compensation, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1984, at A1.
38. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6, at 211 (describing the public’s perception of
diseases linked to vinyl-chloride exposure).
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conditions.39 Increasingly, many diseases were seen as reflections of the world
we had built and the environments we had created.40
The growing concerns about the price we pay in health and well-being for
the pleasures of our unrestrained industrial and post-industrial society has
created new arenas in which history will play a growing and important role.
Especially in the context of the two decades during which the regulatory
agencies OSHA, MSHA, and the EPA have seen their powers curtailed,41 we
can expect more and more toxic-tort cases to be brought to the courts where lay
juries will be asked to judge responsibility for emerging consumer and
environmental problems.
III
HISTORIANS IN THE COURTROOM
It is not the case that historians are only now being called upon to testify.
Beginning in the late 1950s with the landmark case Brown v. Board of
Education,42 expert historical testimony has been employed in courts of law. In
recent decades, historians have testified in a variety of civil cases: claims
brought under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,43 water-rights disputes,44 suits
against schools systems for proposing to teach “creation science” in
classrooms,45 sex-discrimination lawsuits,46 libel cases brought by Holocaust
deniers,47 and, perhaps most famously, suits against the tobacco48 and lead

39. See, e.g., MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6, at 208–09 (identifying various consumer goods
affected by vinyl-chloride residues, which were linked to various health problems).
40. See generally MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6.
41. For example, since the early years of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), severe limitations
have been placed on the activities of these two agencies. Their budgets have been slashed and OSHA in
particular has issued few new standards. See, e.g., Steven Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety in
Hands of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/washington/25osha.
html?_r=1.
42. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (citing historian C. Vann Woodward, author of THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW (1957), in the decision); see also Rothman, supra note 18, at 25.
43. See, e.g., Press Release, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, AALDEF Files
Voting Rights Act Lawsuit Against the NYC Board of Elections, available at http://www.aaldef.org/
articles/2006-02-06_27_AALDEFFilesVot.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Martin, Note, Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical
Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (2003) (listing the various types of cases in
which historians have testified).
45. See, e.g., S. Charles Bolton, The Historian as Expert Witness: Creationism in Arkansas, 4 PUB.
HISTORIAN, Summer 1982, at 59, 60–67.
46. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 111 F.R.D. 385
(N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Rothman, supra note 18, at 26–27 (describing Sears as “the most controversial
case in the 1980s that pitted historian against historian”).
47. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 44, at 1519.
48. See, e.g., Laura Maggi, Bearing Witness for Tobacco, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 23
(describing the testimony of historian Stephen Ambrose in a Louisiana lawsuit against “the big four
tobacco companies and their lobbying arm”); see also Proctor, supra note 7.
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industries.49 The prominence of historians in these cases has led members of the
profession, especially those who have served as expert witnesses, to reflect in
various articles on how expert testimony has affected the practice of history.
These articles have first addressed that perennial “objectivity question”—
specifically, whether representing one side or another in the adversarial process
has compromised the historian’s duty to seek historical truth. Have historians in
these cases been pressured to distort the facts in order to win? This question,
which has persistently dogged historians in general and legal cases in particular,
has led to numerous exchanges in professional journals and newsletters over the
past few years.50 Some, like Brian Martin, a historian working at History
Associates Inc., a consulting service,51 argue that historians can remain
dispassionate observers of historical truth, despite their participation in legal
proceedings.52 In fact, Martin argues, the needs of the legal system to uncover
data both useful and harmful to a client demand this dispassionate objectivity
from historians working as consultants.53
The idea that the courtroom corrupts the practice of history generally rests
on the assumption that epistemological processes of history and litigation
contradict one another, making it impossible to remain faithful to the one while
becoming engaged in the other. J. Morgan Kousser, a California Institute of
Technology historian who has testified in numerous voting-rights cases,54
describes this ostensible clash of knowledge-production cultures as beginning
with the image of the scholar’s pledge to seek and report objective truth:
The image of the lonely scholar, or perhaps, to modernize it a bit, of the lonely
research team, seeking truth by applying their open but careful minds to the
appropriate evidence, is pervasive among social scientists and humanists. Scholars may
55
make mistakes . . . but they don’t, goes this standard stereotype, purposely distort.

In contrast to this image of deliberate objectivity, the courtroom is an
adversarial environment where lawyers “are not to pursue some abstract truth
or social good, but only the very relative interests of the people who hire their
49. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d
428 (R.I. 2008).
50. The issue of scholarly objectivity has vexed historians for decades, well before this recent spate
of lawsuits. In fact, it is among the oldest and most well-worn issues in the historical literature. See
generally ROBERT NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988) (outlining the long, contentious history of battles over
the term and its varied, politically charged uses over the course of the past century).
51. History Associates, Inc., is a consulting service “in historical research and writing, litigation
research, and archives and records management” whose clients include “more than 300 corporations,
government agencies, and professional and nonprofit organizations worldwide.” http://www.history
associates.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2008).
52. See Brian Martin, Working with Lawyers: A Historian’s Perspective, OAH NEWSLETTER, May
2002, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2002may/Martin.html (arguing that historians risk damaging both the
case and their integrity by testifying contrary to historical truth).
53. Id. (noting that attorneys must have “the most complete stories regardless of how that
information might support or counter the client’s interests.”)
54. E.g., Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
55. J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and
Expert Witnessing, 6 PUB. HISTORIAN 5, 14–15 (1984).
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services.”56 But, contrary to corrupting historical truth, the courtroom
encourages “an Invisible Hand [that] guides the process toward the maximum
production of truth.”57
For many, the way that courts and lawyers in particular use evidence and
historical events changes the historian’s role. Columbia University historian
David Rothman, himself an expert witness, argues that the historian should be
involved in using his expertise in trials if the cause is just and the impact
significant, but that the historian should recognize that whatever he or she does
in the courtroom is something other than history.58 Arguing from his experience
in the Vanderbilt radiation cases, Rothman observes that lawyers frame narrow
questions for the historian to answer, and this ultimately undermines the
historian’s autonomy and ability to cast a wide net, to contextualize or to place
events in a deeper historical context.59 He argues that his testimony retained
“the integrity and soundness” of his scholarship and that any additional
research conducted in preparation for that testimony altered none of the
findings offered in his exhibits and depositions in the Vanderbilt case. “To focus
an inquiry,” he insists, “does not distort the results.”60 Like Kousser, he argues
that expert witnesses “dare not contradict their prior positions[,] [for,] if they
did, opposing counsel would immediately pounce on them.”61
It is not accurate, says Rothman, that, as some argue, “expert witnesses are
too committed to their side of the case to remain objective, [for] historians are
no more or less ‘objective’ in the courtroom than they are in the lecture hall or
in print.”62 Yet, because of the constricted nature of work in the courtroom, a
distinction needs to be made: “To enter the courtroom is to do many things, but
it is not to do history. The essential attributes that we treasure most about
historical inquiry have to be left outside the door. The scope of analysis is
narrowed, the imagination is constrained, and the curiosity, curtailed.”63
Historians’ concern about the relationship between the legal process and the
distortions that undermine their objectivity is revealing. After all, the same
critique can be applied to all other disciplines and individuals who serve as
expert witnesses. Certainly no expert practices his or her craft in a court
setting—physicians do not practice medicine; engineers, engineering; biologists,
biology. But because of historians’ own self-reflection, they are particularly
concerned about the distortions the legal process might effect on their
discipline, perhaps because part of their creed is to respect diverse opinions and
to see historical events through many lenses. Since the 1970s, particularly with
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id.
58. Rothman, supra note 18, at 44.
59. Id. at 43–44 (“Lawyers . . . would find the broader issues [that historians would prefer to elicit
both] irrelevant and inadmissible.”).
60. Id. at 44.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the growth of social history and post-modernist theory and the emphasis on
viewing history through the lenses of women, African Americans, the working
class, gays, and others, such issues have only magnified the discomfort of
historians in the courtroom. Integrating the viewpoints and respecting the
perspectives of a wide variety of social actors has become a hallmark of
historical scholarship.64
Attorneys have recognized this tendency to value complexity and nuance,
sometimes at the expense of clarity and precision, and have exploited it in
various ways. For example, lawyers for industries accused of exposing workers
needlessly to dangerous materials, and faced with uncomfortable historical data
(such as minutes of meetings in which the toxicity of a substance is discussed or
other evidence of industry knowledge of harm done), argue that history is an
implicitly subjective discipline, one lacking in a methodology that allows for
replication of results or tests of reliability.65 Some have argued that history is not
a science and that historians are incapable of providing “expert” opinion on par
with the biologist, the chemist, or even the doctor.66 Yet, for the most part, such
arguments have fallen on deaf ears, since similar arguments could be brought
against physicians whose clinical methodologies are often the very subject of
court cases and against other sciences whose Popperian notions of falsification
and reliability are rarely, if ever, tested.67 One judge and historian has written,
Historians who testify are often presented by their lawyers as paragons of objectivity,
however, judges . . . seem to realize that there is no such thing as true objectivity.
Ultimately, the bench looks for the same qualities [in historians as witnesses] that are
required of all experts: appropriate specialization, thorough research, and conclusions
68
that are well supported by the record.

In other words, it is up to the judge and jury to decide on the reliability of
the historian–witness, just as it is up to the judge and jury to evaluate the
testimony of experts in other fields.

64. For an extended discussion of the development of historians’ concerns over objectivity and
subjectivity, see generally NOVICK, supra note 50. Novick worries throughout this book that our
concerns with presenting the various perspectives of the multiplicity of historical actors and
constituencies has led to a confusing cacophony of voices, which has undercut the cohesiveness of the
historical narrative.
65. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 128 (2008).
66. See id. at 60–78 (examining ways in which industry seems to demand more from scientists who
challenge their claims than society should be prepared to accept).
67. See id. Philosopher of science Karl Popper established a set of benchmarks for evaluating
“good” science. Falsification, the process by which scientists try to disprove reported observations, is a
central element of the scientific method. This idealized notion of how scientists establish their results as
truths is contested.
68. John Neuenschwander, Historians as Expert Witnesses: The View from the Bench, OAH
NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2002, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2002aug/neuenschwander.html.

08_ROSNER__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC

Winter 2009]

TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

147

IV
THE DARK SIDE: HISTORIANS CHOOSING SIDES
The courts are both an important and a troubling arena into which
historians are being thrust. Often bookish by nature, most historians have been
brought up in a professional culture that reinforces individual research, often
performed alone in archives that few others have ever visited. Although the
image of the monastic scholar is certainly overblown, there is a grain of truth in
such a stereotype. Scholars in the humanities and in some social sciences often
prize individual effort in what many outside of academia might consider arcane
subjects. Also, in the wider world of academic historians, there is a tendency to
look with a certain skeptical eye at those who popularize, simplify, or even
clarify complex historical events such as the Civil War or the life of Lincoln. In
part, this reticence is due to a concern that popular renderings of complex
historical events are necessarily superficial. But there is also an element of
jealousy involved, for popularizers reach audiences beyond those imaginable
for academic historians, many of whom write for tiny audiences numbering in
the tens, or at most, hundreds.69
In many cases historians are recruited because of their highly specialized
knowledge. This was certainly the case when Jerry Markowitz and I first
became involved in silicosis cases following the publication of our book about
silicosis, nearly two decades ago.70 As historians of occupational disease, we
knew that silicosis, a disabling lung condition caused by the inhalation of silica
dust, had struck down thousands of workers in the decades before World War
II. It was labeled “the king of occupational diseases” by commentators at the
time.71 We had written our book not knowing that the disease was still of great
concern; rather, we saw the book as of interest to labor- and medical historians,
one that could illuminate the ways that discovery of disease was rooted in very
special historical circumstances of economic depression, social dislocation, and
medical change. Interestingly, we had traced the heated debates around silicosis
that had occurred among workers, organized labor, government, and industries
that exposed workers to silica, such as foundries, steel mills, construction, and
sandblasting.72 Shortly after the book’s publication, we learned that the
hardcover version of the book was in short supply and that the press was
considering a paperback edition. How, we asked, could such a book with a
seemingly select and, indeed, small audience be in short supply? Who had
bought it? Its purchasers were certainly not labor- or medical historians, for the

69. Many historians have disdain for those involved in studies of recent events.
70. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS OF
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA (1991). This book was recently updated and
republished as DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE ONGOING STRUGGLE FOR WORKERS’ HEALTH (2005).
71. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22, at 75–104.
72. Id. at 13–104.
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subject was narrow and out of the mainstream of concerns for most scholars in
these sub-disciplines.
After a cursory investigation, the publisher discovered that the book was
being bought by law firms. Soon, we were being called by firms all over the
country, asking us to consult with them about their cases. It appeared that
workers in a host of industries—primarily in Texas, Louisiana, and other Gulf
states—were still coming down with silicosis and were suing a variety of
suppliers for negligence.73 We were asked if we might testify about the historical
understanding of the disease and about what industry leaders themselves knew
of the dangers to workers associated with inhaling silica among sandblasters,
foundry work, granite cutting and polishing, and a host of other jobs we had
written about.
At first, we were hesitant to get involved. It seemed repellent to us to testify
in court, to appear at depositions, and to subject ourselves to possible pressures
to meet the demands of courtrooms. We were scholars, not interested parties;
we were removed from the events of the day by training and inclination, and
were not in the business of testifying, at least not in court. Memories of the
contentiousness that affected the historical profession following the
engagement of two of our colleagues on different sides of the EEOC v. Sears74
case in the 1980s made us especially wary of getting involved.
Yet, after one lawyer came to New York and presented the haunting story
of one of her clients, we changed our minds. She told of her client, a thirty-fouryear-old Mexican worker who had learned of a relatively lucrative job in the oil
fields of west Texas. In the 1970s, following the OPEC oil crisis, when west
Texas crude was once again in demand, a huge oil company had contracted to
have sandblasters come clean out old oil-storage tanks. The company had
shipped hundreds of Mexican workers to the area around Odessa, Texas, had
given them paper “3M” masks and a sandblasting unit, and had had them enter
small, enclosed tanks and blast sand at the layers of tar and oil that had
accumulated on the tanks over the decades. Not surprisingly, several years later,
workers began to die, suffocating from silicosis caused by the inhalation of
finely ground silica dust that had slowly destroyed their lungs.75
It was clear our book could be important in providing financial relief to
some of these workers and their families. In court cases the industry had been
arguing successfully that since virtually “no one” had ever heard of silicosis, “no
one” could be held accountable for a disease that was unexpectedly killing
workers. Our book offered evidence to directly contradict the central tenet of
these arguments: we had documented in minute detail what was medically

73. David Rosner & Gerald E. Markowitz, From Dust to Dust: The Birth and Re-Birth of National
Concern about Silicosis, in ILLNESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 162, 170 (Steve Kroll-Smith, Phil Brown
& Valerie J. Gunter eds., 2000).
74. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 111 F.R.D. 385 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
75. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22, at 222–24.
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known about the disease in the early twentieth century and the industry’s
actions when faced by major lawsuits in the 1930s and after.76 We had
documented that the industry had known of the disease as early as the 1910s.77
We agreed to become “expert witnesses” in two cases.
Whereas our book on silicosis preceded our experience with the legal
system, our next book on industrial pollution grew out of another lawsuit. In
1996 we were called by two lawyers from the City of New York Law
Department. It appeared that the City had been sued by some families whose
children had been injured by lead contained in the paint of some of the city’s
public housing. The city, in turn, had begun a suit against the lead industry,
claiming that the industry bore some responsibility for injuries to these children.
Over a number of years the city had accumulated a moderate-sized roomful of
documents that were drawn largely from the Lead Industries Association, the
trade association for manufacturers of lead paint and other lead-bearing
products. What, the city wanted to know, was in these hundreds of thousands of
pages it had accumulated?
The city had contacted us because of an article we had published in 1985 on
the controversies around lead poisoning;78 we were therefore among, perhaps
the only, historians that had ever studied the industry in any depth. In that
article we traced the history of the controversies around lead poisoning due to
automobile exhaust.79 Coming as it did while the EPA was determining whether
to demand that the industry remove lead from gasoline once and for all, the
article had caused a bit of a stir in the public-health community, even provoking
an editorial from the Journal apologizing for its role sixty years before in
creating such a public-health tragedy.
We were asked to evaluate the roomful of material the city had received
through the discovery phase of the trial. That material became the first part of
our book Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution.80 This
book, an analysis of the role of industry in creating a public-health tragedy,
could not have been possible without litigation, which freed up literally
hundreds of thousands of pages of company documents. In fact, without the
cases, historians would never have seen internal memos and minutes of
meetings in which company representatives from the Dutch Boy or Sherwin
Williams companies, among others, discussed among themselves the dangers
that leaded paint posed to children as early as the late 1920s.81 Nor would we
have been able to learn of marketing campaigns aimed at counteracting public

76. See generally ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 22.
77. See generally id.
78. David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, “A Gift of God”? The Public Health Controversy over
Leaded Gasoline During the 1920s, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 344 (1985).
79. See id.
80. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6.
81. See id. at 64–107.
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concerns over the dangers of lead—ads claiming lead paint was safe and
sanitary and useful on children’s walls, furniture, and the like.82
The documents divulged through the lead-paint and related lawsuits gave us
a new perspective on the history of this terrible public-health tragedy. The
immediate result of our work with the documents was a long affidavit that
became part of the New York City case and that was quickly integrated into
numerous other legal actions underway around the country by the end of 2002,
brought by Chicago, New York, Buffalo, San Francisco, St. Louis, Milwaukee,
and other cities. Some of these were quickly dismissed by judges, but others
were allowed to go forward.83
The first state action against the lead industry was brought by the Attorney
General of Rhode Island, alleging that the industry had knowingly created a
public nuisance by using lead paint on the walls of up to eighty percent of the
state’s housing, thereby putting thousands of children at risk of developing lead
poisoning.84 The trial was intense, but it let the jury see for itself documents that
demonstrated the industry’s knowledge of childhood lead poisoning going back
a century.85 The power of the documents was impressive, and the jury found for
the state, ultimately ordering the lead-pigment manufacturers to “abate” the
lead hazard throughout Rhode Island.86 The potential cost for cleaning up the
State of Rhode Island is immense, as estimates range from $1 to $4 billion.87
Most recently, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court undid years of
litigation when it overturned the jury verdict, reasoning that the case had been
brought to court under the wrong law.88

82. Id.
83. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006)
(listing various cases from around the country); Ryan J. Foley, Milwaukee Loses Appeal in Lead Paint
Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2008, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/nov/25/local/chi-ap-wileadpaint; Chicago's Suit Over Lead Paint Dismissed, LEAD POISONING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, http://
www.lead-poisoning-news.com/articles/illinois.html.
84. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 26, 2007), rev’d, 951 A.2d 428
(R.I. 2008).
85. Id.
86. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434–35, 40 (R.I. 2008) (reciting case history). That
verdict was upheld on appeal and the judge in the case rejected the defense’s plea to overturn the
verdict, writing a 197-page decision in which he often referred to the historical record as presented by
myself and Dr. Markowitz. Peter Lord, Judge Refuses to Overthrow Lead-Paint Conviction,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 27, 2007, at A1, A6. But on July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
overturned the jury verdict in a stunning decision. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435 (reversing
most of the appellate ruling).
87. Immediately after the case was settled the stock market responded to the verdict by forcing
Sherwin Williams stock to plunge and BUSINESS WEEK announced that “Estimates on Lead Paint
Clean-Up Soar.” Michelle Smith, Estimates on Lead Paint Clean-Up Soar, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE,
Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8O42J401.htm. Although the legal
maneuvering by the industry to delay the jury verdict continues, BLOOMBERG.COM announced that in
light of the Rhode Island decision the Attorney General of Ohio has initiated a similar suit. Jef Feeley,
Sherwin-Williams, DuPont Sued by Ohio Over Lead Paint, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 3, 2007, http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=&sid=aQb5ogfWCWQk.
88. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 455–59 (holding that the defendants’ actions were not
cognizable as a public nuisance, but suggesting that they might sound in products-liability law).
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The second part of the book detailed records we had gone through
regarding the vinyl-chloride misnomer and what the industry knew about its
potential dangers.89 It was this portion of the book that taught us a big lesson
that we are only now beginning to analyze and understand. Around 1998 we
had been asked if we would be willing to take a look at an enormous store of
company documents from the chemical industry that had been turned over
during the course of an ongoing lawsuit concerning a vinyl-chloride worker
dying from angiosarcoma of the liver.90 We were asked by the plaintiffs’ lawyers
to help evaluate what was in this store of materials and whether there was
reason to believe the chemical industry had acted knowingly regarding these
workers’ safety.91 Our efforts with these records resulted in a three-hundredpage timeline of knowledge and activities by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association that has become the basis for a number of lawsuits against the
industry.92
V
DEFENDANTS DISCREDIT PLAINTIFF’S HISTORIANS AND HIRE THEIR OWN
EXPERTS: WHO KNEW WHAT, WHEN, AND DID IT MATTER?
Throughout the nation, toxic-tort cases are leading companies to seek their
own historian–experts to argue that the companies bear no responsibility for a
host of conditions that appear associated with exposure to implants, asbestos,
pharmaceuticals, and the like. Tobacco, mining, paint, plastics, and chemical
companies have begun to hire historians to use their skills in what some critics
have called an effort to obscure and to confuse the historical record about
responsibility, knowledge, and risk.93 In some sense, the role of historians of
medicine and science, some argue, has been to create confusion rather than to
illuminate history.94
Although many historians have decided to enter the fray on behalf of
injured parties,95 others have been hired by tobacco, lead, and other industries
as “experts” to defend the actions of a variety of companies.96 These historians
have often sought to “contextualize” unseemly past activities including the
89. See generally MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 6.
90. Angiosarcoma of the liver is extremely rare, occurring in as few as two dozen people in the
United States in any given year. Nicholas J. Vianna, Judith Brady, Philip Harper, Angiosarcoma of the
Liver: A Signal Lesion of Vinyl Chloride Exposure, 41 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 207, 207 (1981).
91. We travelled to Lake Charles, Louisiana on a number of occasions to review documents and
identify those that we needed copied and shipped back to us in New York.
92. The timeline is available at http://www.deceitanddenial.org/docs/timeline.pdf. Dr. Markowitz
has agreed to testify and has been deposed but, for a number of personal reasons, I have not
participated in the cases.
93. See generally Rothman, supra note 18 (arguing to the contrary that “historians can serve clients
without subverting the canons of the discipline [of history]”).
94. DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE
THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 9 (2008).
95. See, e.g., Proctor, supra note 7, at 1175.
96. Id.
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knowing, direct sale or marketing of tobacco, lead, and other toxins to children,
despite industry knowledge about their dangers.97 Historians of great and lesser
renown have used their expertise and prestige on behalf of lead and tobacco98 or
for industries in a host of other toxic-tort suits.99
How, then, can we begin to evaluate the place of the historian in the
courtroom? First, we might ask what the basis for the historian’s testimony is.
Nathan Schachtman, a defense attorney in toxic-tort cases, argues that whatever
the historian can do, the lawyer can do better, or at least as well.100 In his
depiction, historians are little more than presenters of abstracted data that
Schachtman calls “facts”—dates, documents, statements, events.101 As such,
there is little reason for considering them experts.102
But the historian’s skills include an ability to contextualize, to weave
together and make sense out of many discrete pieces of information that, alone,
usually contain ambiguous and unintelligible random facts. By placing such
facts in a broader historical context and drawing from a variety of sources both
directly and indirectly related to the subject, the historian takes what may seem
to be idiosyncratic events and makes them intelligible, part of a continuous
stream of information that reveals infinitely more than any one document can
possibly reveal. Hence, the skilled historian can take many documents and tie
them together or take a single document and make it intelligible. Obviously,
recent twentieth-century historians often have a huge store of information to
work with, summarize, and contextualize,103 whereas a medievalist might have
only a single primary document, such as an illuminated manuscript, with which
to work. But both have the ability to draw out meaning, whether through the
words, pictures, or sounds in the document itself or from the events and
literature that the document itself speaks to.
In contrast, attorneys, as often as not, see the historical record very
differently: they attempt to find discrete documents that either “tell the whole
story”—“smoking guns,” so to speak—or that reveal the true intent or
knowledge of individuals. When asked for “one or a handful of documents that
tell it all,” I have to explain the complexity of historical narratives. Certainly,
some individual documents can, and do, stand on their own. But more typically
it is the accretion of information, the development of knowledge, the sequential
accumulation of meetings, minutes, advertisements, scientific, or medical

97. Id.
98. See Proctor, supra note 9, at iv118.
99. See id. at iv122.
100. See Nathan Schachtman, On Deadly Dust and Histrionic Historians: Preliminary Thoughts of
History and Historians as Expert Witnesses in Products Liability Cases, in MEALEY’S LITIGATION
REPORT: SILICA 1 (2003) (arguing that trial lawyers try cases by the same “researching, documenting
and adducing evidence of historical fact” that historians do).
101. Id. at 2.
102. See id. at 1–2 (arguing that historians’ claims cannot be proven by “admissible evidence,” and
that lawyers can argue anything that a historian could bring up).
103. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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articles, speeches, and more, that require explanation by historians trained in
piecing together necessarily incomplete historical materials.
Historians are sensitive to the incomplete nature of the historical record.
Records are, from the historian’s perspective, never complete. This does not
mean historians can never reach conclusions, but it does mean that—within
limits—there are reasonable, differing ways to interpret data. We could not say
that someone “really knew” that she was making false statements, misleading
the public, or lying to others, for we cannot give a lie-detector test to the
historical figure. For the historian, the accumulation of data, of information,
allows limited statements. We can “know” that company representatives were
present at a string of meetings when childhood lead poisoning was discussed,
but were they paying attention? Were they out of the room when these issues
were discussed? What was going through their minds when they interjected a
statement into the record? Were they completely out to lunch except when their
own words are specifically mentioned in the transcript of a meeting? Were they
full participants?
For the lawyer, such acknowledgement of gaps in the historical record
amounts to uncertainty and is useful in creating doubt and discontinuity. The
very complexity of history often provides openings to create ambiguity or even
to undermine the historian’s craft. A skilled lawyer can present the world as a
series of discrete events and, when interested in undermining testimony, can
often disconnect, rather than connect, the dots. The ambiguity or limited scope
of a particular piece of information will become the means of dividing and
decontextualizing the historical record, leaving the argument disassembled, in
pieces, incomprehensible.
To illustrate, during one of my depositions in the Rhode Island lead suit, I
had presented a listing of the times in the 1930s when the Lead Industries
Association had talked about lead poisoning and childhood lead poisoning in
particular. The statements in the industry-association minutes seemed clear
enough, coming, as they were, after many hours of discussion of the early
twentieth-century medical literature on childhood lead poisoning (from
children nibbling on lead-painted toys, cribs, woodwork, et cetera) and
numerous mentions in trade and other publications of lead poisoning (among
workers, including children working in lead-pigment-manufacturing plants),
movements to ban the use of lead by twenty-one countries, and numerous
others instances identifying lead pigment as a “deadly, cumulative poison,”
whose use should be banned or limited to the outdoors. Those collecting data,
providing information to the public about lead, and systematically following all
that affected the market for their product, could not reasonably claim, we
believed, to know nothing at all about the evidence pouring out.104 We could
understand the industry-trade-association minutes’ proclaiming that lead

104. For a summary of the available documentary materials, see ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra
note 6.
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poisoning consumed immense amounts of the association’s time as meaning
that the industry was unquestionably aware of the issue, no less than when the
association’s annual meetings reported on “Lead Poisoning.”105
From my perspective, there was little question that one could connect the
dots, most of which, for a historian, were the size of stains. But this was not the
case for all, as illustrated when the lawyer for one of the companies sought to
separate each statement, to identify the gaps in knowledge rather than the
continuities. Noting that the annual-meeting minutes mentioned lead poisoning
in general over a number of years without identifying “childhood” lead
poisoning in particular, the lawyer asked me whether it was possible that the
industry just “wasn’t aware” or “didn’t know” that childhood lead poisoning
was an issue in those years. Was it possible that by this question these lawyers
thought the issue “resolved?”
In a related splitting of epistemological hairs, the historian is also sometimes
asked if he or she can “really know what’s in a person’s mind.” One lawyer, for
example, faced with letters saying that a physician had been visited by the tradeassociation head to dissuade him of his belief that lead was poisoning children
in Baltimore, wanted me to “admit” that the head of the trade association might
really have “believed” that lead was not really a problem:
Lawyer: Do you have any evidence that Mr. Wormser [the secretary of the trade
association] was other than sincere in his stated views that lead toxicity was
exaggerated in the public press?
I: Other than sincere?
Lawyer: Yes. Do you have any evidence that he did not believe the things he was
saying?
I: (How does one answer that question?) Well, I’m certainly not in his mind. It seems
very odd that a man who lived through this entire period, and who had access to the
kind of information he had access to, and who continually sought to calm
apprehension and had enormous amounts of information surrounding him, did not
suspect that there might be a problem here. . . .
Lawyer: (But did I “know” that he “knew,” understood, believed differently?)
I: (I had to “admit” that.) Whether he’s sincere, I just don’t know. . . . I have no idea
106
how to get to the soul of that man.

Asking the expert witness, a historian, what he knows about what the
defendant knows, in his soul, is as absurd as it sounds.

105. Id.
106. Deposition of David Rosner at 35–36, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc, (No. 99-5226)
(July 6, 2005) (from vol. III, videotaped at the law offices of Arnold & Porter, N.Y., N.Y.).
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VI
FROM “HOW CAN THE HISTORIAN KNOW WHAT INDUSTRY KNEW?” TO
“HOW CAN ANYONE KNOW ANYTHING”?
When faced with the client’s evidence that industry representatives tried to
influence doctors to reverse themselves regarding diagnoses, to influence
legislators to stop regulations that might inhibit the use of lead paint, or to prod
school and other officials to buy lead paint, a lawyer for the industry might
argue that, despite that evidence, there is no reason to suspect that the industry
representative was “successful” in changing behavior.
I was specifically asked,
Lawyer: Do you have any evidence of any doctor being visited who withheld
information or changed [his or her] opinion?
I: No . . . I don’t have any writing that says “I changed my opinions on the basis of this
person’s decision or this person’s visit.”
Lawyer: You also don’t have any LIA [Lead Industry Association] document
indicating that they changed anyone’s mind, do you?
I: Well, we have a number of LIA documents in which Wormser claims that he’s
changed [the] opinions of numerous people, from state legislators, to people writing
warning labels, to physicians who[m] he felt visits to were very profitable . . . .
Lawyer: [But do you “know” he changed peoples’ minds?]
I: [No.] I don’t have any writing that that says “I changed my opinions on the basis of
107
this person’s decision or this person’s visit.”

The point of the exchange was to get me to state that the actions of the
industry, no matter how reprehensible, might not have had any effect
whatsoever and to show that the historical evidence of the industry’s efforts to
shape the outcome through mass advertising as well as through visits to doctors,
legislators, and administrators was irrelevant to the legal proceedings. Further,
the questioning was aimed at undermining any affirmative answer I might give
regarding the defendants’ intent or what they understood regarding the dangers
of their product.
The ambiguity of the historical record can work to the advantage of
industries not only in its lawyers’ attempts to undermine the testimony of the
plaintiffs’ historians. In fact, instances of historians emphasizing the difficulties
of making historical judgments in the context of testimony for both sides
abound. Philip Scranton, for example, a historian of business and technology at
Rutgers,108 was hired by lawyers for the asbestos industry to write a timeline of

107. Id. at 28.
108. Scranton also wrote and signed the chemical industry’s attack on my colleague Gerald
Markowitz and myself. For a complete transcript of his attack on us, reviews of our book, and our
response to his attack, see www.deceitanddenial.org. In addition, we provide a link to nearly 20,000
documents that were the basis for much of our research in the parts of our book that he attacked.
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important events from the 1930s through the 1960s.109 He gave depositions in
which he literally argued that the knowledge of others is itself difficult to
discern, if ever even attainable.110 In nine pages of his deposition, he outlined an
arbitrary set of events in the history of technology that he deemed worthy of
inclusion, none of which mentioned asbestos or asbestos-related disease.111 I can
only guess at the purpose for including him as a witness in a case regarding
asbestos exposure, other than to illustrate that people had many other things on
their minds than disease in the period between the Depression and the 1960s.
But at the deposition, the questioning by plaintiffs’ lawyers took an
interesting turn. Scranton was asked whether he had an opinion about whether
a company should have warned workers about their knowledge regarding the
dangers of asbestos exposure in the 1930s. To this he gave a long answer
regarding what it meant to “know” something in science.112 Before definitive
statements could be made, he argued, information had to be tested, confirmed,
retested, and subjected to years of examination.113 So even if the company said
something in 1936 indicating it “understood” that asbestos could injure the
workforce, this was something different from “knowing” it was dangerous; the
company therefore had no responsibility to inform the workers of information
that it was not sure of.114 “The problem with the question,” Scranton began,
is the ambiguity about what “‘knowing’” means. . . . In the history of science and
technology, there are multiple stages of knowing before action in sort of a grand sense
can be taken. You can know, for example, that there’s a problem. And when a
problem is identified, multiple participants will assess the severity of the problem,
trying to figure out how bad it is. They’ll disagree. And after a period of time, some
kind of consensus comes about the challenges this problem presents. And then there’s
a problem that has to be addressed about how to measure it, and that goes through a
series of discussions among scientists or technologists and engineers. And there are a
lot of proposals about how to measure the issue that’s at hand. And after some work
on that front and some agreement or at least debate about terms of measurements,
scientists and engineers and technologists focus on what will fix the problem, and that
involves a period of work because it’s not obvious, often, what will fix the problem,
and there are a whole bunch of proposals for that. And then after another period of
time, some kind of consensus is reached on figuring out how to get the problem fixed.
115
All of those are stages of knowing, one after another.

Such a process can take years, even decades, and apparently, in the
intervening period of time, Scranton seemed to be saying, there was no
responsibility to warn. Obviously, historians have no trouble making their
testimony obscure.

109. See Deposition of Philip Scranton, In re W. Va. Asbestos Litig., No. 02-C-9004 (Cir. Ct.
Kanawha Cty., W. Va.).
110. See, e.g., id.
111. For example, he identifies a series of technological events from atomic bomb through the
launching of satellites as examples of the types of issues (other than asbestos) the broader population
was paying attention to. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 33–34.
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So historians have been valuable in lawsuits to obscure the past, as well as to
illuminate it. It appears that the legal strategies of the law firms have been more
or less the same, following a common pattern and a common rationale. David
Michaels has argued that one of industry’s goals in civil actions is to produce
uncertainty and doubt about the reliability of scientific information.116 Historian
Robert Proctor has coined the term “agnatology,” to describe a new “science”
for the creation of historical doubt and ignorance about actions in the past.117
Proctor, Michaels, and more recently, Allan Brandt, Gerald Markowitz, and I
argue that lawyers for the tobacco, lead, and asbestos industries, among others,
appear to have adopted a few basic techniques that promote these goals. In
general, these lawyers have argued that (1) whatever the evidence that
industries had past knowledge of a product’s dangers, any information was
insufficient to definitively prove real danger; so (2) more research was always
needed before doubt could be eliminated, and questioning that a material was
dangerous meant that there was a “controversy” about whether it was; (3)
causation is extremely difficult to prove and requires years, if not decades, of
careful experimentation and observation in order to quiet any “controversy”
about the sources of disease. (4) Hence, without certainty, and in the context of
any ongoing controversy about the danger of a product or substance, industries
are under little or no obligation to remove their products from the market or to
lower exposures to toxic materials within the factory.
Industry’s argument about our book, our depositions, and our testimony in
vinyl, lead, and silica cases, closely parallels this structure:
1. There was always a reason to gather more and more information before
telling government, workers, or the public of the possibility that a
substance was carcinogenic in humans at low doses.
2. Science is a slow, cumulative process that demands that information
about danger not be revealed until scientific proof exists and after
“controversy” over that proof is laid to rest.
3. Industry always had valid reason to doubt the accuracy of any finding of
carcinogenesis.
4. History is a complex process in which clarity is rare and confusion the
norm.
5. Historians who draw conclusions indicating industry malfeasance are
sloppy, simplistic or biased.
6. Objectivity” in historical analysis requires that
a. equal weight of plausibility be provided to all sides in an
argument and that no judgments be made, and
b. even disinformation, including all self-serving statements, be
presented as legitimate.

116. MICHAELS, supra note 94, at 9.
117. Proctor, supra note 9, at iv118.
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7. Every conflicting piece of information should be reported, irrespective
of its importance to the historical questions being asked.
8. Incomplete knowledge is equivalent to controversy about that
knowledge.
9. One should ignore evidence of responsibility in favor of evidence of
ambiguity or innocence.
10. Positive peer reviews or post-publication reviews are invalid unless the
reviewers have read all the primary documents.
11. Any sign of “presentism”118 is bad, except when it exonerates the
industry.
12. When all else fails, quibble endlessly about adjectives, nouns, or adverbs
used to describe or summarize corporate behavior, then seek to
sidetrack arguments and raise phony issues.
Industries are playing on our professional propensity to see complexity and
ambiguity in human events.
VII
WHY HISTORIANS IN THE COURTROOM?
In this context, it is important to recognize the growing demand for the
historian’s skills. We may be dragged kicking and screaming into moral
dilemmas in which we are forced to determine the boundaries of our
involvement in public disputes. In part, this will be an unwelcome circumstance.
Yet we owe society a great deal and we owe those who are often without voice a
great deal more. The demands from the legal system will force us to crystallize
our sense of purpose and the humanistic traditions that lend legitimacy to our
field. A greater relevance and involvement of historians will force us to define
what is “good” history, both methodologically as well as morally.

118. “Presentism” refers to historians’ work that addresses, or is influenced by, questions emerging
from contemporary problems or issues. Some see this style as an intrusion on the “objectivity” of the
historian, as it often imposes on the past modern questions that may or may not have been issues then.
See generally NOVICK, supra note 50; DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD
A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970).

